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SQUARE PEGS AND ROUND HOLES: DOMESTIC
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND NATIVE
AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL POLICY:
CAN IT FIT?
David B. Jordan*
We have now had 200 years of experience with the Age of
Reason, and as reasonable people we ought to recognize that
reason has its limitations. The time is ripe for developing a
conceptual framework based on our fallibility. Where reason has
failed, fallibility may yet succeed.
- George Soros'
I Introduction
Native American tribes and artisans have become world renowned for
unique and high quality cultural "art." However, the pilfering and
plundering of Native Americans and their environment that began 500 years
ago continues today as Native Americans are robbed of their culture. Native
American cultural and spiritual works, created by tribal artisans that learn
techniques and designs passed down for generations, are exploited in the
open market, duplicated by minimum wage workers or machines, traded at
bargain basement prices created by the saturation of the market with cheap
knock-offs, and dishonored and defaced by buyers and sellers that lack the
proper respect that should be afforded to culture with such a deep heritage
and tumultuous history.
All of this occurs in an era of self-determination. Native American tribes
are encouraged, if not mandated, to take up the economic and cultural
vitality of their groups internally. This charge is fueled by a domestic
policy towards Native American tribes that is less about entitlements and
integration and more about self-sustainment and sovereign control.
Intellectual property law, which recognizes the intellectual value of
expression and creation apart from the tangible value of the medium itself,
is a product of art and innovation. However, United States intellectual
property law, because of its strong personal property and capitalist roots, is
ill-equipped to address the unique cultural interests of Native American
tribes. Intellectual property protection can act as a vehicle not only to
*J.D., 2000, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 45, 58, quoted
in David L. Moore, Rough Knowledge and Radical Understanding: Sacred Silence in American
Indian Literatures, 21 AMm. IMIAN Q. 633, 633 (1997).
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further Native American policies of self-determination by providing
economic incentive to engage in the production of "art," but also to
strengthen protection of the cultural assets of Native American tribes.
This article concludes, in Part II, that domestic intellectual property
policy lacks respect for the moral and economic rights of artists, limits
protection for authors as a market growth incentive, and values copyright
as a welfare tax on the public instead of a private right of the author, and
therefore limits the utility of intellectual property protection for Native
American tribes. In Part EI, this article illustrates that, despite international
support for moral rights of indigenous groups, the United States has been
lackluster in encouraging additional protection in the area of intellectual
property towards Native American tribes. In Part IV, this article attempts
to provide a foundation for legislation that will provide Native American
tribes not only with the ability to preserve their cultural heritage, but to also
develop an avenue for economic development for which Native American
tribes are uniquely suited.
II. The Shortcomings of U.S. Intellectual Property Law
A. Inventory of Native American Intellectual Assets
The intellectual wealth of Native American tribes and its members is
perhaps the greatest untapped, undervalued, and misappropriated asset
retained by the Native American community. The intellectual wealth of
tribes is an aggregation of tribal innovation and expression. The value of
that innovation and expression is skewed by diametrically opposed societal
values between Native American tribal communities and contemporary
America. To the American capitalist, Native American expression can be
valued based on its beauty, intrigue or history. To Native Americans, that
expression exhibits spiritual and cultural value. As a result, an inventory of
intellectual wealth of expression becomes a severed approach.
An inventory of the intellectual wealth of Native American expression
would be exhaustive, especially regarding the different valuing schemes of
tribal communities and contemporary Americans. However, to advocate for
maximizing the utility of Native American intellectual assets, it is necessary
to illustrate the scope of intellectual playing fields available to Native
American tribes.
A survey of American museums would most certainly turn up evidence
of Native American intellectual wealth.' Museums have been acquiring
Native American objects for display and resale since the 19th century In
fact, one commentator noted that by the end of the 19th century there was
2. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repartition Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 35, 43-45 (1992).
3. See id.
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"more Kwakiutal material in Milwaukee than in Mamalillikulla, more Salish
pieces in Cambridge than in Comox... the city of Washington contained
more Northwest Coast material than the state of Washington and New York
City probably housed more British Columbia material than British Columbia
itself." Not surprisingly, these museums probably contained carvings and
paintings, beadwork and pottery, clothing and canoes, dream-catchers and
pictures from "shadow-catchers."' Record stores now contain traditional
Native American music on compact disc, pumping traditional flute music
and spiritual peyote songs into homes nationwide.6 Every toy store contains
a replica of an Indian drum and war tomahawk, as does every collector of
Native American cultural property own the real thing. Native American
folklore, misappropriated and published by many who are non-Native
Americans, represent a deep oral intellectual wealth. A recent Valley Guide
Quarterly7 contained dozens of advertisements, gallery notices, art displays,
pictures, and descriptions of Southwest Native American (and Mexican)
artwork.' These comments illustrate the economic market generated by the
strength of the intellectual wealth of Native American tribes and artisans.
This market value, tagged by the contemporary American culture, illustrates
the economic viability of intellectual wealth within the Native American
community.
The tribal value of Native American expression is much more cultural,
and much more religious. Consider the plight of the Chilkat Indians who
struggled to recover the "Whale House" artifacts.' The Whale House
artifacts were actually wooden posts depicting various cultural scenes."
The Chilkat Indians valued the artifacts not because of their economic value
but because of their cultural and ceremonial value." Another example of
tribal value of intellectual wealth is evidenced by the tribal claimants under
the Native American Graves Protection and Repartition Act" who are
seeking from museums, universities, and others, the return to the tribe of
cultural and sacred objects (as well as funerary objects and human remains)
4. d
5. Shadow catchers, commonly known as cameras, were regarded by Native Americans as
devices that produced drawings that captured shadows.
6. See, e.g., VoicEs Aceoss THE CANYON, VOLUME ONE (Canyon Records).
7. See generally the Winter 2000 issue of the Valley Guide Quarterly.
8. Interestingly, the guide contained a notice from the Indian Arts and Crafts Board of the
Departmnent of Interior noting the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and the requirement that "all
products must be marketed truthfully regarding the Indian heritage and tribal affiliation of the
artist." I& at 33.
9. See Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We
Finally Recognized Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects? 8 J. ENvT L. & Lmo. 109,
112 (1993).
10. See id,
11. See id.
12. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994).
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because of the object's cultural value to the tribal community, despite
economic loss to the museums and others. Although these Native American
"expressions" themselves do not hold any intellectual wealth, the
"expressors," retain the intellectual capital required to produce these
economic, and of course cultural, expressions.
Native American intellectual property assets also include those concepts
created by innovation, that is, regarded not for its aesthetic or artistic value
but for its utility. Native American innovation is most often evidenced in
the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries. A classic example often cited
by commentators is the innovation of the Hopi and Zuni tribes in
developing and maintaining traditional crops, plants and seeds as part of its
agrarian past.'3 Contemporary American society has drawn upon these
innovations, creating an economic market for the Hopi and Zuni tribes in
seed bank distribution and plant variety maintenance.'4 One common
illustration of the Hopi and Zuni tribes' crop innovation is blue corn. Blue
corn has become a popular ingredient used in regional foods, as well as in
traditional restaurants.'" The intellectual wealth associated with these
products is attributed to the tribe: their experience, persistence, and
knowledge.
Innovation and expression are protected by United States law in different
ways - such as by patents, trademarks, and copyrights - primarily
because of the difference in valuation discussed above, as well as the
dissimilarities in the incentives that United States law presumes are required
to further the constitutional mandates in furthering innovation and
expression. As a result, the concept of maximizing innovation within the
Native American community is beyond the scope of this comment; however,
many of the discussions regarding the difference in societal values affecting
expression are applicable to innovation as well. The bulk of this article
discusses the U.S. framework for protecting Native American expression,
and the ability of that protection to further Native American interests in
economic development and cultural maintenance.
B. United States Copyright Law
1. Authorship
United States copyright law is the statutory vehicle responsible for
protecting intellectual expression. Copyright protection in the United States
provides a "bundle of rights" to authors of fixed expressions."6 These
13. See Richard A. Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20 AM.
INDIAN L. Rav. 111, 120-21 (1995-96); Thomas Greaves, Tribal Rights, in VALUING LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE 32 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds. 1996).
14. See Guest, supra note 13, at 121.
15. See Greaves, supra note 13, at 32.
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (stating that copyright protection "vests initially in the author
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rights, extended to the original author, or her assignees, afford strong
protection, and consequently, economic return for the "intellectual" property
of authors. That bundle of rights includes the right to copying, the
preparation of derivative works, 7 the right to control sale and distribution
and the right to control the public performance and display." An author
is granted those rights upon the fixation of an expression upon a medium,
and those rights can only be limited by the subsequent assignment of the
rights to a third party, or by statute.
Copyright does not rely on registration, or notice, or government
approval to reward authors for creative original works, instead, copyright
vests immediately upon the creation of the work. Although Copyright law
does provide incentives to supply public notice of copyright, as well as
registering works with the copyright office, strong remedies are still
available for an author claiming infringement of a work regardless of
whether notice or registration took place. 9 Those rights, in part, or in
whole, can be transferred to third parties during the term of the copyright,
or can be retained by the author and her beneficiaries until the expiration
of the copyright.
The federal protection of copyrights apply only if the copyright can vest
initially with the author of the work;" that is, the work "owes it origin to
the author."'" In addition, copyrights exist only for a limited time - the
duration of the life of the "original" author (plus a period of years),
regardless of whether the original author still owns the copyrights in the
work. As a result, copyright protection is unlike real or personal property;
copyrights are merely limited property interests granted by the public in
return for flourishment of Art.
or authors of the work").
17. Derivative works are works that are based on the original work but in different or altered
forms. See ROBERT P. MERGES IT AL., INTELLECruAL PROPERTY IN A NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 325 (1997). For instance, a translation of a literary work written in the native Cherokee
language would be a derivative of the original literary work. The right to create that translation
would belong to the original author of the literary work, or her assignees. However, the
translation itself is also copyrightable, to the extent that differs from the original work.
18. See MERGES ET AL, supra note 17, at 325.
19. Failure to provide notice, otherwise known as copyright formalities, allows a defendant
to assert a defense of innocent infringement which serves to limit the damages that a plaintiff
might claim for infringement of a work. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.02(cX3) (David
Nimmer ed. 2000) [hereinafter NiMMsR]. Failure to federally register a copyright deprives the
plaintiff of an opportunity to seek statutory damages and attorney fees, as well as an opportunity
to establish a prima facie case as to the validity of her copyright. See id. § 7.16(C)(1).
20. See id. § 201.
21. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fime Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); see also
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("[Clopyright
ownership vests initially in the author or authors of the work."); Alfred Rutenberg Homes, Inc.
v . Drew Homes, Inc., 29 F.3d 1529, 1531 (1994) ("Copyright inheres in authorship and exists
whether or not it is ever registered.").
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After the expiration of the copyright, the property becomes part of the
public domain, for its exclusive use. The copyrights in the work cannot be
"recaptured" by another party. Essentially, the economic value of the
work itself is devalued, to the extent that it can be duplicated by
competitors. In addition, each author may choose not to exploit a work, and
withhold it from the marketplace completely. This non-economic choice of
the author,' one that could be described as a moral choice, is also
abrogated; the work is still available at the end of the limited protection
period for public consumption.
However, copyright law has provided for alternative approaches to the
rule of original authorship. Those approaches include joint works, works
made for hire, collective works and the transfer of rights." Joint works are
works "prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unity
whole."' A work made for hire is defined under the Copyright Act as "a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment"
or "a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work ... if the parties expressly agree" to consider it a work
made for hire.' The Supreme Court has narrowly defined this provision
to allow for works made for hire in only the employer-employee or
independent contractor setting.27 The collective work exception to
authorship is applied by statute to "a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting
separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole."'"
Each of these exceptions to the concept of original authorship share a
similar feature, the original author is identified as part of the ownership
matrix, either as a hired creator, or as a participant in the ownership scheme
as a joint or collective author. Each of these schemes were developed for
particular authorship models that further the goals of specific relationships
and industries; however none of these exceptions neatly fit into the needs
of Native American tribes attempting to claim ownership in works that are
centuries old.
22. Of course, a derivative work could be created, incorporating the prior art; however, the
resulting copyright would only be in the derivations themselves and not the original work.
23. This choice is not necessarily non-economic; it is possible the work was withheld from
the marketplace to protect the market niche of other works. However, the market avoidance
prevents the economic devaluation of the other works, and is essentially, economic.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 201; see also Christine Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous
Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV 1, 31 (1997).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
26. See id '
27. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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The American copyright system stumbles as it attempts to protect
"group" rights that lack either identification of any actual original author,
or alternatively, the requisite intent to enter into a legal relationship to
create a joint or collective work. Tribal works are infrequently original
individual creations. The works created in the tribal community are the
result of group participation, as well as generational participation." Each
tribal generation adds or takes away from the work, exhausting the
opportunity to identify original authors.
Take, for instance, the case for the Hopi Tribe. The Hopi tribe has
become well-known nationally, and internationally, for the work of Hopi
kachina carvers.' These carvers, through generations of instruction,
fashion world renowned kachina dolls?' The actual design for the carvings
dates back centuries, developed by ancestors, generations ago; the design
itself is quite similar to the learned design of present day carvers, altered
only by the erosion of time. Because of the exquisite quality of the kachina
dolls, the marketplace demanded comparable economic consideration.
However, the kachina dolls and the Hopi Tribe fell victim to capitalism.
The market, starved for similar products at a much lower price, opened its
doors to several "kachina-like" doll manufacturers in northwestern New
Mexico. 2 As a result, the Hopi tribe suffered not only from the cultural
diminishment of non-native production of spiritual "embodiments of
deities," but also the devaluation of the economic worth of the hand-carved
kachina dolls.33
The alternatives for the Hopi tribe under the United States' copyright
protection scheme were limited. The design for the kachina dolls, which
certainly themselves fall within the defined subject matter for copyright,3'
29. See id. at 32-35.
30. See Guest, supra note 13, at 125.
31. See id
32. See id.; see also Mark Shaffer & Bill Donovan, Manufacturing of Fake Kachinas Offend
Hopi, NEws FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Feb. 1994, at 6, cited in Guest, supra note 13, at 125.
33. Guest, supra note 13, at 125.
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 102. The statute reads, in part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression .... Works of authorship include the following
categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
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lacks the original authorship element for valid copyright protection. The
author" of the original design, which is most likely centuries old, is long
deceased. If any copyright protection existed at all, it existed during his
lifetime and for a short period after words. The tribe itself cannot be
considered an author, nor its teachers; copyright requires original
authorship; "a work must be original to the author." 6 The copyright would
have vested with the ancestor that, with creative spark, 7 formed the
independent design for a kachina doll. Any future kachina dolls made based
on the original work - after the extinguishment of the copyright after the
author's death - would only be protected by copyright to the extent that the
later doll differed from the original doll; the original design for the kachina
doll becomes part of the public domain. The economic value of the
copyright for the later dolls becomes de minimus. The original design
becomes the model for competitors, leaving a scarce market for copyrights
in the derivative works. As a result, tribes and kachina carvers are unable
to capture revenue from the work created by their ancestors, nor are they
able to limit the cultural exploitation of the competitor's similar works.
Native American tribes are better served by allowing "tribal" ownership
in ancient (and present) day expressions. In order for tribes to truly protect
not only the economic, but also the cultural exploitation of tribal intellectual
assets, a tribe should consider ways to maintain ownership of a portion of
the copyrights. Could it be possible for a tribe to assert a joint works
relationship with its tribal artisans in an effort to maintain authorship rights
in the intellectual assets? Could the tribe and its artisans be viewed as a
work made for hire; "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment?"'" Consider the definition of joint works: works
"prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unity whole."39
Perhaps it is conceivable to consider the tribe, the clearinghouse of tribal
35. The reference to author instead of creator corresponds to the designation used throughout
American jurisprudence on copyright. While one might envision a sculptor or designer as a
creator, and a writer or artist as an author, all of the works which fall within the protectable
subject matter of copyright as said to have originated with an "author."
36. Fiest Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (noting that the "sine qua non
of copyright is originality" (emphasis omitted)).
37. Fiest, 499 U.S. at 345. The Fiest Court agreed that a degree of creativity is what
separates that which is original and that which is not. See id. The obviousness of that statement
should be tempered by an alternate theory, that labor is that which separates an original and the
later work. This Lockean, or "sweat of the brow" theory, explains that labor performed on
property can create ownership rights to the laborer. See MERGES Er AL., supra note 17, at 333.
Although this theory is more often discussed in regards to compilations of facts (which are
unprotected under copyright law), it raise interesting questions as to whether art can exist without
creativity.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
39. See id.
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knowledge, as an author, preparing a "work," with the intention of the tribal
artisan and the tribe creating a united piece of art. If the tribe, as a
community, could be viewed as, at least, a joint author in a work, then the
tribe could assert proprietary control through copyright over the created
work. In addition, if a tribal community can act as an author of a work, and
copyright extends to the death of an author, could then tribal communities
assert perpetual protection of their creative works? Finally, perhaps it is
possible to create a statutory exception, providing tribes a communal
copyright interest in tribal expressions. These concepts of communal
property and perpetual protection will be discussed in further detail in
below.
2. Limitations on Term Protection
Regardless of the drawbacks of original authorship, works in the United
States are only given legal protection for a limited period of time. The
maximum term of protection for copyrighted works is the life of the authors
plus an additional 70 years.4 This limitation in protection is the necessary
balance of an author's individual incentive to create and the constitutional
goals to further the progression of the Arts." Without a limitation in the
protection of works, future creators would be powerless to utilize previous
works to create new "derivative" works. In addition, the limitation of works
directly advances the Constitutional requirements. " If an author can retain
an entire "bundle of rights" in her works, future authors will be unable to
further the progression of the arts. There is an additional concept of public
welfare imposed by the Constitution. Limiting the protection of works
creates a welfare benefit for the public, allowing for future unencumbered
use of a previously protected work, in exchange for a limited property
interest designed to incentivize the creation of the original work 3
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
41. See U.S. CONs. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "); Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (discussing the purpose of the limited scope of
copyright protection "reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest; [c]reative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts"); see also MERGES
Elr AL., supra note 17, at 327.
42. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 ("The sole interest of [copyright] ... lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985) (stating that copyright law is intended "to allow the public
access to the products of [the author's] genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired."); cf Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 150 (1801) ("We must take care to guard...
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.");
see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 327.
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Additionally, failure to provide any term protection at all will
disincentivize authors to create. The ability to retain term protection in a
created work provides an author the ability to reap economic benefit for her
economic and intellectual investment. This return on investment provides
incentives for authors to continue to create, as well as encourage new
authors to enter the market. Additionally, the return on investment is still
restricted by traditional market forces, such as competition and demand,
allowing for the production of both higher quality works as well as higher
quantity works, both of which contribute to enhanced public welfare.
The resulting drawback from this term limitation on protection of works
is that the author (actually, the assignees or beneficiaries of the author) lose
all protective benefits at the expiration of the term. What was fully
protected by force of law the day before the expiration of the copyright is
now completely within the public domain, allowing for the public's
complete dominion as well as exhaustion of the work and its accompanying
rights.
The underlying force of the Constitutional balance of limited term
protection and public welfare is inherently economic. Innovation and
creativity, essential to a successful economy, can be spurred only by
economic incentives to create." However, this capitalistic, Western
European goal is not necessarily shared by Native American tribes.
Individual property rights and market competition thrive in the Euro-
American society; however, tribes, which are quite communal in nature, are
much more utilitarian. As one commentator noted, Native American tribes
are societal in nature, and the individual ownership of property, if it occurs
at all, is founded in a value structure that creates for utilitarian purposes.'
The classic distinctions of commercial objects, aesthetic objects, functional
objects, and sacred objects becomes blurred in tribal communities,
recognizing and exposing a society that is far more communal, both socially
and productively.'
As such, the American copyright system is inherently contrary to the
typical Native American tribal ethos. In addition, the American copyright
scheme will continue to starve Native American tribes of cultural, spiritual,
44. See Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the
internationalization of intellectual Property, 24 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1995) (noting
that "international intellectual property has become, primarily, the mechanism for redressing trade
deficits and for maintaining a competitive edge in global markets"); see id. at 112 (noting that
the "central claim is that all forms of creative expression - mechanical, literary, or artistic
are value driven").
45. See Gana, supra note 44, at 119-20; see also Byrne, supra note 9, at 110-11 (noting that
Native American tribes "view their cultural artifacts as communal property which cannot be sold
by individual tribal members").
46. See id&
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and intellectual works as individual artists turn their backs on tribal
communities for economic gain.
In response to a patchwork of lobbying interests and international
pressures, the United States enacted a limited number of measures that
altered the traditional framework of copyright authorship and term
protection."7 The result of these measures is that Native American tribes
have benefitted, although in extremely narrow circumstances, from a system
that has become a little more communal, a little more perpetual, and even
a little more moral.
C. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
In November of 1990, Congress provided the first broad legislation
protecting cultural property for Native Americans since the antiquated
"Indian-Made" laws were passed in 1935." As a result, the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) has given
Native American tribes their first glimpse at opportunities for communal,
as well as perpetual, ownership of certain tribal objects." NAGPRA was
enacted to specifically protect "Native American burial sites and the
removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects and objects of
cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands."'
Through the power of the federal legislation, cultural objects and remains
throughout the country are finally being reunited with Native American
tribes. Museums, dealers, universities, and private collectors have been
forced or pressured to return various cultural objects to the tribal
communities.5 Native American tribes, in their lobbying efforts for
NAGPRA, managed to deflate the pressure of strong, traditional American
property rights in the ultimate recovery, communally, of tribal cultural
property. As a result NAGPRA itself begs the ultimate question, is their
hope for Native American perpetual and communal intellectual property
rights?
Although NAGPRA applies only to objects, and not intellectual property,
it does provide insight into the framework and potential concerns of
communal ownership of cultural property. The definition of communal
property - actually described as objects of cultural patrimony - illustrates
the potentiality of assigning (actually recognizing) intellectual property right
ownership to tribes. Cultural patrimony is defined as:
47. See supra text accompanying notes 48-70.
48. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305c (1994).
49. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994).
50. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367; see also Byrne, supra note 9, at 126-31 (discussing the
implications of NAGPRA on communal property rights of Native American tribes).
51. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 9, at 24-26; Steve Russell, The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing:
Implementation of NAGPRA in Texas, 19 AMER. INDIAN CULTuRE & RESEARCH J. 193, 193-94
(1995).
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[Qibjects having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural
importance central to the Native American group or culture
itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native
American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated,
appropriated, or conveyed by an individual regardless of
whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian
tribe... and such object shall have been considered inalienable
by such Native American group at the time the object was
separated from the group.'
The definition of "cultural patrimony" is broad, allowing for both natural
and manmade objects. Cultural patrimony most certainly covers "art" - at
least as a capitalist would define ie - to the extent that "art" is also
cultural patrimony. As a result, there becomes a strangely woven quilt of
contemporary intellectual property law and tribal cultural property law.'
Tribes are able to recapture the communal rights to the actual art itself, but
are still shackled by the inability of U.S. copyright law to prohibit the
production of "derivative" works.
Consider the following example: NAGPRA presumably applies to the
Iroquois Wampum belts.'5 The tribes, under the federal direction of
NAGPRA can request for the return of these specific Wampum belts from,
for instance, a public museum, who purchased these belts from a collector
for a sizeable price. The federally funded museum cannot recover the cost
of its investment. The museum is ultimately guilty of its implied
insensitivity to Native American culture (and its receipt of federal funding,
of course). However, as discussed above, the intellectual knowledge in
creating these Wampum belts has long since entered the public domain and
the tribe does not have the ability to limit the production of Wampum belts.
Consequently, the design and style of the Wampum belts can be replicated,
presumably close to perfect, by individual artisans and resold to the same
museum for much less than its original purchase. The Iroquois tribe has
recovered the actual cultural property, but only the physical manifestation
of the cultural value of the property. The true cultural value of the
Wampum belts is ultimately diminished by the subsequent exploitation of
the replicas traded on the market to museums. This is also true for the
property's economic features as well.
52. See 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(d).
53. The American Heritage Dictionary defines art as "the activity of creating beautiful
things." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 41 (Peter Davies ed., paperback ed. 1976).
54. Cultural property, in this sense, as cultural patrimony.
55. Presumably, because Congress specifically referred to the Wampum belts as an example
of what might be included under the definition of "cultural patrimony" in its legislative debates.
See S. REP. No. 101-473, at 1, 7-8 (1990); see also Byrne, supra note 9, at 128.
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The enactment of NAGPRA was federal acknowledgment of a Native
American culture that is noncapitalistic, secular, and communal.' The
framework of the statute provides tribes with the ability to sculpt what
objects are considered alienable and which are not. In addition, the
framework also clearly delineates the inability of individuals to convey
ownership of certain objects unless under the direction of tribal leadership.
The statute illustrates two communal property right maxims; the existence
of cultural property within the tribe, and the subsequent inalienability of the
same property. NAGPRA, although not an intellectual property scheme,
provides unique insight into the adaptability of communal and perpetual
rights to Native American intellectual property policy.
D. The Berne Convention & Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990
In 1989, the United States acceded to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The 100-year-old Convention
extended, through subsequent amendments, uniform international standards
in the protection of literary and artistic works." Although the United States
had a well developed body of Copyright law by 1989, the United States
was, at least in part, fundamentally at odds with the extension of moral
rights protection to Copyright law."8 As a result of the accession to the
Berne Convention, and the resulting pressure to enact moral rights
legislation that complied in spirit to the Berne Convention, 9 Congress
enacted the Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).' VARA
represented the first time in the history of United States copyright law that
moral rights were incorporated into the "bundle of rights" for authors.6
56. See, e.g., Guest, supra note 13, at 115.
57. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
58. See Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common LawCountries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 229, 239-40 (1995). Moral rights, discussed infra,
traditionally encompassed a body of common law that protected the rights of an author in a work,
regardless of the ultimate alienability of that object. The Berne Convention provided that:(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or otherderogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.(2) The rights granted to the author ... shall, after his death, be maintained,
at least until the expiry of the economic rights.... However, those countries...
may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, be maintained.
Berne Convention, art. 6 btr.
59. See Dworkin, supra note 58, at 260 (noting that one reason for enacting VARA wasperhaps to placate those people who thought that the United States had not honored its obligations
under the moral rights section of the Berne Convention).
60. Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A, 113(d) (1994).
61. See Dworkin, supra note 58, at 259.
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VARA provides for authors the right of attribution and integrity for works
of visual arts.62 Visual arts are defined as paintings, drawing, prints, or
sculptures existing in single copies 3 With many notable exceptions" -
enough to make moral rights the exception, and not the rule - the act
establishes rights for authors that extends to the moral essence of the object,
and not the economic valuation of the object. VARA first provides, subject
to the limitations of the doctrine of fair use, that an author "shall have the
right to claim authorship" of his or her work, and to "prevent the use of his
or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create," or otherwise known as a right of attribution." The Act also allows
an author a right of integrity, that is, a right to prevent any "intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [a] work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."' However, this right of
integrity67 is limited by its initial scope - visual arts - as well as its
waiver provisions."
The true query becomes the application of VARA to Native American
tribes. Does this Act stimulate the ability of United States Copyright law
to foster Native American goals relating to intellectual property? The query
should be addressed at two levels. Does VARA provide Native American
tribes the opportunity to economically benefit from tribal intellectual
property? Does VARA allow Native American tribes to retain and enhance
cultural development?
VARA does little to provide true economic benefits to Native American
tribes. For instance, VARA does not provide additional intellectual property
protection, including the rights of attribution and integrity, for any
expression beyond visual art. The remaining economic value in the
attribution of various objects to authors is certainly limited. The right of
attribution merely provides an author, a tribe, or tribal artisan, for example,
the opportunity to claim or disclaim authorship to a specific object. The
economic benefit for tribes in a right of attribution is limited to transactions
upon which future owners would pay additional consideration for the
subsequent waiver of the ability of tribes to require the attribution of the
tribal author, or the removal of the tribal author's attribution upon the
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
63. See id § 101.
64. See id § 106A, 113(d).
65. See id § 106A(a)(1).
66. See § 106A(a)(3)(A).
67. See § 106A(a).
68. See § 106A(a), (e). Questionably, the inability to transfer VARA rights and the
inapposite ability to waive VARA rights begs the question. In a bargain between parties, the
demand for waiver and the transfer are identical, beyond the differences in formalities.
Consequently, the protection that the nontransfer clause provides to authors is annulled by the
ability of an author to waive VARA rights.
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mutilation, destruction, etc. of the object. As a result, the right of attribution
coupled with the opportunity for statutory wavier provide little economic
benefit to tribes.
In addition, the rights of integrity, which allow for tribal authors to
prohibit the mutilation, destruction, etc. of visual arts is limited by statute
to those visual arts that are "of a recognized stature"" and, in addition
must also be prejudicial to the "honor"7 of the author. Native American
tribes must not only, to retain this right of integrity, show that a tribal
object is of a stature that rises to a heightened threshold, and must also, in
addition to previous requirement, demonstrate that the tribe's honor would
be prejudiced by the destruction, modification, etc. of the tribal object. As
a result, Native American tribes derive little economic benefit from narrow
rights of integrity because of the concomitant narrow risk that bargainers
will attribute to the value of demanding that Native American tribes waive
their rights of integrity.
VARA does provide limited cultural protection for Native American
tribes. The right of attribution in visual arts provides to Native American
tribes the corresponding respect and dignity accompanying Native American
objects, even after they have been sold, traded, or given to nontribal entities.
The value of this right should not be discounted. Similarly to the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act,"' the right of attribution prescribed by VARA allows
tribal authors to maintain the integrity of the cultural tradition by publishing
to those that come in contact with the object the proper attribution.
Unfortunately, the right of attribution retained by the tribal authors would
cease to exist along with the termination of the legal copyright protection
seventy years after the death of the author. VARA essentially brings us
back full circle to the original problems with identification of authorship
and limited term protection. Regardless of the protection that is afforded for
objects that are created within the author's life and shortly thereafter, the
ability of tribes to protect attributional issues is eliminated, and the value
of the cultural property is exposed for diminishment by outside sources.
The same is true for the right of integrity. The value to tribes and tribal
artisans of the right to prohibit modification or destruction of property rights
is a windfall for tribes that have watched the degradation of sacred and
ceremonial paintings and drawings. VARA allows Native American authors
to monitor and control the subsequent use of Native American visual arts
69. lit § 106A(a)(3XB).
70. Id. § 106A(a)(3XA).
71. 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305c (1994). The Indian Arts and Crafts Act (JACA) was initially
enacted, and subsequently amended, to assure the authenticity of Native American arts and crafts.
See Guest, supra note 13, at 115. The Act imposed civil and criminal penalties to authors who
attempted to falsely attribute original authorship to Native American tribes or artisans. See id.;
25 U.S.C. § 305.
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so as to preserve the cultural integrity of the those arts. The cultivation of
the cultural integrity provides for the harvest of additional intellectual works
within the Native American community as well as provide the appropriate
respect and honor that Native American communities might place on various
works created within the Native American community.
VARA represents the high water mark for Congress in providing
protective legislation allowing Native American tribal artisans to retain
minimum moral rights in limited types of "expression." As a result, the
cultural and economic benefit to tribes can best be anticipated as limited.
III. International Position on Intellectual Property Rights
for Indigenous Peoples
A. United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Internationally, moral rights are given much more credence, as to both
nationalist and aboriginal "expressions." In addition, the concept of tribal
/ communal ownership, as well as perpetual protection of certain moral
rights are being utilized and debated in various parts of the world. Besides
the Berne Convention's treatment of moral rights in Article 6 bis, the most
noted document advocating moral rights, as well as the rights of indigenous
peoples is the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Declaration).' The Declaration was the 1994 product of a
72. See The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. DOC. EICN.4/1995/2; E/CN.4Sub.2/
1994/56, Oct. 28, 1994 [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. The purposes of the Declaration are
notably enlightening regarding the potential for enhanced recognition of Native American tribes
and peoples. The purposes included:
[1] Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal in dignity and rights to all
otherpeoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider
themselves different, and to be respected as such,
[2] Affirming that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of
civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind,
[3] Affirming that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating
superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin, racial,
religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally
invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust,
[4] Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should
be free from discrimination of any kind,
[5] Insuring that indigenous peoples have not been deprived of their human
rights and fundamental freedoms, resulting, inter alia, in their colonization and
dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from
exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own
needs and interests,
[6] Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights and
characteristics of indigenous peoples, especially their rights to their lands,
territories and resources, which derive from their political, economic and social
structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies,
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subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on Human Rights and
represents the culmination of years of work in developing, albeit
controversially, an authoritative declaration of the rights of indigenous
peoples." The Declaration was developed by representatives of indigenous
peoples all over the world. These representatives included the Indian Law
Resource Center, the American Indian Law Alliance, Plain Indians Cultural
Survival, Pro-Hawaiian Sovereignty Working Group, Teton Sioux Nation
Treaty Council, Conic Navajo Nation Working Group on Human Rights, the
Western Shoshone Nation, the Muskogee Creek Nation, as well as numerous
other continental Native American groups. The Declaration was submitted
for debate and adoption as a comprehensive declaration of numerous rights
of indigenous peoples" Article 12 of the draft declaration states that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to
maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and
historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and
visual and performing arts and literature, as well as the right to
the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual
property taken without their free and informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs."
[71 Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for
political, economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring an end
to all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur,
[8] Insuring that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting
them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,
[9] Recognizing also that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and
traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and
proper management of the environment,
[10] Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and
communities to retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education
and well-being of their children,
[II] Recognizing that indigenous peoples have the right freely to determine
their relationships with States in a spirit of coexistence, mutual benefit and full
respect
Id.
73. See Robert T. Coulter, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
What is It? What Does It Mean?, 13 NrHERLANDs Q. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123, 124 (1995).
74. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Twelfth Session,
EtCN.4/Sub.2/1994/30, Aug. 17, 1994.
75. Draft Declaration, supra note 72, art. 12.
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The declaration also states in Article 29 that "[i]ndigenous peoples are
entitled to the recognition of the full ownership, control and protection of
their cultural and intellectual property."'7
The international community is coming together to address and solve
some of the very concerns facing indigenous peoples world wide that I have
addressed previously in reference to Native American tribes here in the
United States. The international community has at least recognized the
importance, not only of preserving, but revitalizing the cultural heritage of
Native Americans. In addition, the international community has pointed out
that, despite closet assimilationists in the United States, Native American
tribes can possess spiritual and cultural foundations regarding property,
political structure, and social order that are far different than many nation-
states. As a result, their intellectual and cultural property must be
recognized and protected, not by the nation-state, but by the sovereign
Native American tribes.
The draft declaration alludes to many of the moral rights contained in the
Berne Convention treaty, as well as many of the communal and perpetual
rights discussed above. Article 12 speaks to the protection of the past and
future cultural objects, including the manifestations of these works." This
protection is precisely what U.S. copyright law fails to provide. In the
discussion of U.S. copyright law above, federal law failed to provide
perpetual intellectual property protection for tribal expressions because of
both lack of identifiable authorship and the limitations on term protection
for fixed expressions. The draft declaration also provides for the ability of
indigenous peoples to maintain past and future manifestations of their
cultural and spiritual property." This language is similar to the rights of
integrity recognized in a moral rights scheme, allowing for one to manage
the use of one's expression, regardless of ownership. The declaration also
uses language that seems to support communal ownership. This communal
ownership extends to the ownership of cultural and spiritual expressions,
and their underlying intellectual property rights, by the tribal community as
a whole. In article 29, the language in the declaration states that the
ownership of cultural and intellectual property rights should remain with the
indigenous peoples.'
The United States, in a response to a similar draft by the Organization
of American States, noted that the United States could not accept an open-
ended obligation allowing for repartition of cultural property.' The United
76. Id. art. 29.
77. See Draft Declaration, supra note 72, art. 12.
78. See id.
79. See id. art. 29.
80. United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States, Comments of
the United States on the Draft "Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,"
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States, however, proposed a revision that would require nation-states to
provide a legal framework for the "protection of indigenous culture."" It
is unclear whether this revision could be interpreted to mean that the United
States might be open to alternative legal methods, similar to NAGPRA, in
the protection of Native American economic and cultural intellectual
property. In addition, the United States emphasized the present U.S.
framework that provides ample protection of intellectual property through
trademarks, patents, and copyrights.' However, as discussed above, this
legal framework does little to address the cultural and economic needs of
Native American tribes.
B. Le Droit Morale (Moral Rights)
The doctrine of moral rights has its roots in the common law of many
European countries. 3 Many European countries, in the past or presently,
rely on moral rights, to varying degrees, to protect the moral value of an
author's creation." Those countries include Frande, Germany, Spain,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy,
Dec. 19. 1996 [hereinafter U.S. Response]; see also Proposed American Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 26, 1997. The
pertinent articles stated:
[Rights to Cultural Integrity]
I. Indigenous peoples have the right to their cultural integrity, and their
historical and archeological heritage, which are important both for their survival
as well as for the identity of their members.
2. Indigenous peoples am entitled to restitution in respect of the property of
which they have been dispossessed, and where that is not possible, compensation
on a basis not less favorable than the standard of international law.
(Intellectual Property Rights]
I. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition and the full ownership,
control and protection of their cultural, artistic, spiritual, technological and
scientific heritage, and legal protection for their intellectual property through
trademarks, patents, copyright and other such procedures as established under
domestic law; as well as to special measures to ensure them legal status and
institutional capacity to develop, use, share, market and bequeath that heritage to
future generations.
Id.
81. See U.S. Response, supra note 80, art. VII.
82. See U.S. Response, supra note 80, art. XX.
83. France is often attributed to being the source of le droit moral, or moral rights. See SAM
RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONvENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:
1886-1986, § 8.94 (1987). However, Germany developed during about the same time period a
similar moral rights scheme, known as Urheberpersnlichkeitsrecht. See id.; Adolf Dietz, Alai
Congress: Antwerp 1993: The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law
Countries, 19 CoLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 199, 201 (1995).
84. See RiCKETSON, supra note 83, § 8.94-.101.
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Belgium, Norway, Portugal, Greece and Denmark.' In some instances,
those common law rights have been legitimized by statutes."
For the most part, moral rights have generally been regarded as
"perpetual, inalienable and imperscriptible [sic]"'" In addition, those rights
have been stated as protecting the "personal, intellectual, and spiritual
interests of authors."" As a result, authors of various types of expressions
have the ability to control the decisions regarding the "moment, place,
extent, destination and time of dissemination," configuration, form and
content, and "under what name." their expressions might take, as well as the
quality and form of derivatives of original expressions." Moral rights can
be described much like we describe copyright, as a bundle of rights. Those
rights include the right to paternity, or right of attribution, the right of
integrity, the right of divulgation, and the right to repent.
The right to paternity invests in the author the right to claim authorship
of the work. The right to integrity allows an author "to object to any
distortion, mutilation of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the...
work which would be prejudicial to honor or reputation."" The right of
divulgation allows an author to "release work from private sphere and to
expose it to the public"" Finally, the right to repent allows an author the
withdraw a work from the public sphere, as well as to refuse to attribution
to one of the author's works.
Moral rights, as a rule, in Eastern Europe, are inalienable.' Leaving
moral rights protection to the negotiations of parties over contract terms
begs the question: What effect will this hollow protection have on a party
with limited bargaining power?9 3 There still remains a similar question
regarding the waiver of moral rights. Moral rights, as a rule, are typically
not waivable. To allow moral rights to be waived is counterproductive with
the inalienability element. However, waiver of moral rights in many
jurisdictions is common. In addition, the ability for industry to adapt works
of art is widespread, and to not allow for waiver of these rights seems
incompatible with the current trend of adaptation contracts." It also
85. See id. § 8.94-.101.
86. See iii
87. Code de la Propriete Intellectuelle (Fr.), art. L.121-1, at 4. cited in Dietz, supra note 83,
at 207.
88. Dietz, supra note 83, at 207.
89. Id
90. 1971 Paris Text to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works art. 6 bis., S. TREATY Doc. No. 27,99th Cong. 37 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention],
cited in Dietz, supra note 83, at 222.
91. Dietz, supra note 83.
92. Id at 208.
93. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 58, at 236.
94. Dietz, supra note 83, at 221.
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appears clear that the Berne Convention is generally silent regarding the
assignment or waiver of moral rights.95
Internationally, the treatment of an author's moral rights as perpetual is
scattered, and typically turns on which parties are able to enforce violations
of moral rights." A moral rights scheme that provides protection to the
moral rights of the author perpetually can be enforced by family members,
or legal successors and to a limited extent, public interests that could be
affected by infringement. This approach is evidenced in several European
countries, including Spain, Italy, France and Belgium. 8 In other European
countries, including Germany, the moral rights of an author end at the death
of the author."
Several U.S. states have enacted various forms of moral rights. Much of
this legislation is similar to VARA, protecting the rights of attribution and
integrity in visual arts. For instance, California provides for rights of
attribution and integrity in "fine arts" for a limited duration."° New York,
Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, New Mexico, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey,
and Rhode Island also have similar types of legislation to that of California,
all providing limited rights of attribution and integrity for narrow classes of
visual arts."'
IV. A Proposed Framework
As illustrated above, U.S. copyright law is ill-equipped to address the
cultural and economic concerns of Native American tribes. With respect to
those concerns, the following represent the fundamental deficiencies in U.S.
intellectual property law:
- U.S. intellectual property law does not provide tribes, as opposed to
individual tribal artisans, intellectual property rights in fixed expressions.
- U.S. intellectual property law does not provide intellectual property
protection for expressions created beyond the last century.
- U.S. intellectual property law does not provide rights of integrity and
attribution for a broad category of fixed expressions.
These deficiencies limit the ability of Native American tribes to achieve
two goals: (1) protect the cultural and spiritual integrity of tribal heritage
95. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 8D.01(B).
96. Dietz, supra note 83, at 216.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id
100. See CAL Civ. CODE 987 (1995); see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 8D.08.
101. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1771 (West 1998); GA. ANN. CODE § 10-1-47
(West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 304A8-304A23 (West 1996); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231 §
85S(c) (Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT., tit. 27, § 303(2) (1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4
(West Supp. 1999); R.I. STAT. § 5-62-3 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1 (Supp.
1999); see also NIMMER, supra note 19, § 8D.09.
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by limiting the exploitation of cultural and spiritual works; and (2) realize
the potential economic benefit of managing the creation and trade of those
cultural and spiritual works.
Enacting legislation to cure the deficiencies noted above would further
Congress' goal of providing a legal and political self-determination
framework for Native American tribes. The legislation could provide an
alternative avenue for economic development as well as foster stronger
relationships between the federal government and Native American tribes
in the context of cultural sensitivity towards Native American issues.
Such federal legislation could include:
- Provisions for recognizing communal intellectual property rights
vested in the Native American tribes. This vesting of intellectual property
rights in the tribe itself could be -the result of a shared or "joint" ownership
between the individual artisan and the tribe. Alternatively, intellectual
property rights could escheat to the tribe upon the death of the artisan.
Another alternative could be to condition membership in the tribe to
agreement to certain covenants, including the assignment of intellectual
property ownership of any cultural or spiritual works to the tribe.
- Provisions for providing perpetual intellectual property protection for
works created by Native American artisans. The provision could be carried
out by eliminating the term expiration for works that are created, or
certified, by Native American tribal artisans. As a result tribes could retain
not only the intellectual property rights in the work, but also in any
derivative works that might be created in the future. Outside manufacturers
would be required to license with tribes for the rights to produce works for
which the tribes retained intellectual property rights.
- Provisions allowing Native American tribes to "recapture" intellectual
property rights retrospectively for works that are part of the tribal heritage.
This provision would take works that were in the public domain and vest
them with tribes, allowing tribes to benefit from the present exploitation of
Native American cultural and spiritual property.
- Provisions creating, in Native American cultural and spiritual
property, rights of attribution and integrity to be retained by Native
American tribes for the existence of the tribes. This provision would allow
not only the retention of cultural honor in works, through the right of
attribution, but also the management and maintenance of the integrity of
cultural and spiritual works by allowing tribes to prohibit unauthorized use,
modification, or destruction of those works. These provisions would forbid
the alienation or prescription of the rights of integrity and attribution.
V. Conclusion
Native American tribes and artisans have developed a world renowned
reputation for "Art." United States intellectual property law, because of its
strong personal property and capitalist roots, is ill-equipped to address the
[Vol. 25
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss1/4
No. 1] SQUARE PEGS & ROUND HOLES 115
unique cultural and economic interests of Native American tribes, lacks
respect for the moral rights of artists, limits protection for authors as a
market growth incentive, and values copyright as a welfare tax on the public
instead of a private right of the author. Despite international support for
moral rights of indigenous groups, the United States has been lackluster in
encouraging additional protection in the area of intellectual property towards
Native American tribes.
A framework does exist for providing Native American tribes the ability
to manage their cultural integrity and honor, as well as create additional
avenues of economic development in a field that Native American tribes are
acutely prepared. All that remains is the United States to recognize the
broader obligations of a true trust relationship.
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